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The Federal courts have jurisdiction in admiralty in cases of collision between
steamboats on the navigable rivers of the United States, even though the collision
occurs above tide-water.
Such collisions, where the remedy is by a direct proceeding against the vessel
and not against the owners, constitute causes of admiralty cognisauce.
. By the 9th section of the Act of Congress of September 24th 1789, the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States is exclusive, except where the common law is competent to give a remedy.
A state statute authorizing in cases of collision between steamboats on navigable rivers, a proceeding in the state courts against the vessel by name, its seizure
and sale to satisfy any liability that may be established, is in conflict with the constitutional legislation of Congress conferring admiralty on the District Courts of the
United States. In such cases the state courts cannot exercise a concurrent jurisdiction ; and the common law is not competent to give such a remedy.
. The history of the adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States on
the subject of admiralty jurisdiction reviewed, and the principles established by
that tribunal, stated by MimLLn, J.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The substance of the record, so far as it is necessary to consider it here, is shortly this:
A collision occurred between the steamboats Ad. Hine and
Sunshine on the Mississippi river, at or near St. Louis, in which
the latter vessel was injured. Some months afterwards, the
owners of the Sunshine caused the Ad. Hine to be seized while
she was lying at Davenport, Iowa, in a proceeding under the
laws of that state, to subject her to sale in satisfaction of the
damages sustained by their vessel.
The owners of the Ad. Hine interposed a plea to the jurisdiction of the state court. The point being ruled: against them, it
was carried to the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the
lower court was affirmed; and by the present writ of error we are
called upon to reverse that decision.
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The record distinctly raises the question, how, far the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States in admiralty
causes, arising on the navigable inland waters of this country, is
exclusive, and to what extent the state courts can exercise a concurrent jurisdiction ?
Nearly all the states-perhaps all whose territories are penetrated or bounded by rivers capable of floating a steamboat-have
statutes authorizing their courts, by proceedings in rern, to enforce
contracts or redress torts, which if they had the same relation to
the sea that they have to the waters of those rivers, would be
conceded to be the subjects of admiralty jurisdiction. These
statutes have been acted upon for many years, and are the
sources of powers exercised largely by the state courts at the
present time. The question of their conflict with the constitutional legislation of Congress on the same subject is now for the
first time presented to this court.
We are sensible of the extent of the in.terests to 'be affected by
our decision, and the importance of the principles upon which
that decision must rest, and have held the case under advisement
for some time, in order that every consideration which could properly influence the result might be deliberately weighed.
There can, however, be no doubt about the judgment which we
must render, unless we are prepared to overrule the entire series
of decisions of this court upon the subject of admiralty jurisdiction on western waters, commencing with the case of The Genesee Chief, in 1851, and terminating with that of The Moses Taylor,
decided at the present term; for these decisions supply every
element necessary to a sound judgment in the case before us.
The history of the adjudications of this court on this subject,
which it becomes necessary here to review, is a very interesting
one, and shows with what slowness and hesitation the court
arrived at the conviction of the full powers which the Constitution and Acts of Congress have vested in the federal judiciary.
Yet as each position has been reached, it has been followed by a
ready acquiescence on the part of the profession and of the public
interested in the navigation of the interior waters of the country,
which is strong evidence that the decisions rested on sound principles, and that the jurisdiction exercised was both beneficial and
acceptable to the classes affected by it.
From the organization of the government until the era of steam-
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boat navigation, it is not strange that no question of this kind
came before this court. The commerce carried on upon the
inland waters prior to that time was so small, that cases were not
likely to arise requiring the Aid of admiralty courts. But with
the vast increase of inland navigation consequent upon the use of
steamboats, and the development of wealth on the borders of the
rivers which thus became the great water highways of an immense
commerce, the necessity for an admiralty'court, and the value of
admiralty principles in settling controversies growing out of this
system of transportation, began to be felt.
Accordingly we find in the case of The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson, reported in 10 Wheat. 428, that an attempt 'Was made
to invoke the jurisdiction in the case of a steamboat making a
voyage from Shippingport, in Kentucky, to a point some distance
up the Missouri river, and back again. This court seems not to
have been impressed with the importance of the principle, it was
called upon to decide, as, indeed, no one could then anticipate the
immense interests to arise in future, which by the rulings in that
case were turned away from the forum of the Federal courts.
Apparently without much consideriation-certainly without anything like the cogent argument and ample illustration which the
subject has since received here-the court declared that no Act
of Congress had conferred admiralty jurisdiction in cases arising
above the ebb and flow of the tide.
In the case of The Steamboat Orleans, llPeters 175, the court
again ruled that the District Court had no jurisdiction in admiralty, because the vessel, which was the subject of the libel, was
engaged in interior navigation and trade, and not on tide waters.
The opinion on this subject, as in the case of The Thomas Jeffer
son, consisted of a mere announcement of the rule, without any
argument or reference to authority to support it.
The case of Waring v. Clar , 8 How. 441, grew out of a colli.sion within the ebb and flow.of the tide on the Mississippi river,
but also infra corpus eomitatus. The jurisdiction was maintained
on the one side and denied on the other with much confidence.
The court gave it a very extended consideration, and three of the
judges dissented from the opinion of the court, which held that
there was jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction above tidewater was not raised, but the ibsence of such jurisdiction seems
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to be implied by the arguments of the court as well as of the dissenting judges.
The next case in order of time, The Genesee Chief, 12 How.
457, is by far the most important of the series, for it overrules all
the previous decisions limiting the admiralty jurisdiction to tidewater, and asserts the broad doctrine that the principles of that
jurisdiction, as conferred on the Federal Courts by the Constitution, extend wherever ships float and navigation successfully aids
commerce, whether internal or external.
That case arose under an Act of Congress, approved February
26th 1845, 5 U. S. Stat. 726, which provides that "the District
Courts of the United States.shall have, possess, and exercise the
same jurisdiction in matters of contract and tort arising in, upon,
or concerning steamboats, or other vessels of twenty tons burden
and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and at
the time employed in navigation between ports and places, in different states and territories, upon the lakes and navigable waters
connecting said lakes, as is how possessed and exercised by the
said courts in cases of like steamboats and other vessels employed
in navigation and commerce upon the high seas and tide-waters,
within the admiralty and mritime jurisdiction of the United
States." The Genesee Chief was libelled under this act for
damages arising from a collision on Lake Ontario. A decree
having been rendered against the vessel, the claimants 'appealed
to this court.
It was urged here that the act under which the proceeding was
had was unconstitutional.
1st. Because the act was not a regulation of commerce, and was
not therefore within the commercial clause of the Constitution.
2d. Because the constitutional grant of admiralty powers did
not extend to cases originating above tide-water, and Congress
could not extend it by legislation.
The court concurred in the first of these propositions, that the
act could not be supported as a regulation of commerce. The
Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion, then entered into a
masterly analysis of the argument by which it was maintained
that the admiralty power conferred by the Federal Constitution
did not extend beyond tide-water in our rivers and lakes.
This argument assumed that in determining the limits of those
powers, we were bound by the rule which governed the Admiralty
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Court of Great Britain on the same subject at the time our Con
stitution was adopted. And it was said that the limit of the
court's power in that country was the ebb and flow of the tide.
This was conceded to be trie as a matter of fact, but the Chief
Justice demonstrated that the reason of this rule was that the
limit of the tide in all the waters of England was at the same
time the limit of practicable navigation, and that as there could
be no use for an admiralty jurisdiction where there could- be no
navigation, this test of the navigability of those waters became
substituted as the rule, instead of the havigability itself. Such a
rule he showed could have no pertinency to the rivers and lakei
of this country,, for here no such test existed. Many of our
rivers could be navigated as successfully and as profitably for a
thousand miles above tide-water as they could below; and he
showed the absurdity of adopting as the test of admiralty jurisdiction in this country an artificial rule, which was founded on a
reason in England that did not exist here. The true rule in both
countries was the navigable capacity of the stream; and as this
was ascertained in .England by a test which was wholly inapplicable here, we could not be governed by it. The cases of The
Thomas Jefferson and The Steamboat Orleans, already referred
to, were then examined and overruled.
This opinion received the assent of all the members of the
court except one.
Although the case arose under the Act of 1845, already cited,
which in its terms is expressly limited to matters arising upon
the lakes and the navigable waters connecting said lakes, and
which the Chief Justice said was a limitation of the powers conferred previously on the federal courts, it established principles
under which the District Courts of the United States began to
exercise admiralty jurisdiction of matters arising upon all the
public navigable rivers of the interior of the country.
This court also, at the same term in which the case of The
aenesee Chief was decided, held in P'retz v. Bull, in which the
point was raised in argument, that the federal courts had jurisdiction accordiig to the principles of that case in the matter of a
collision on the Mississippi river above tide-water.
As soon as these decisions became generally known, admiralty
cases increased rapidly in the District Courts of the United States,
both on the lakes and rivers of the West. Many members of the
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legal profession engaged in these cases, and some of the courts
have from this circumstance assumed, without examination, that
the jurisdiction in admiralty cases arising onthe rivers of the
interior of the country is founded on the Act of 1845; and such
is perhaps the more general impression in the West. The very
learned court whose judgment we are reviewing has fallen into
this mistake in the opinion which is delivered in the case before
us, and it is repeated here by counsel for the defendant in error.
But the slightest examination of the language of that act will
show that this cannot be so, as it is confined, as we have already
said, to cases arising "on the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes." The . jurisdiction upon those waters is
governed by that statute, but its force extends no further.
The jurisdiction thus conferred is in many respects peculiar,
and its exercise is in some important particulars different under
that act from the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Act of
September 24th 1789.
1. It is limited to vessels 6f twenty tons burden and upwards,
enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade.
2. To vessels employed, in commerce and navigation between
ports and places in different states.
8. It grants a jury trial if either party shall demand it.
4. The jurisdiction is not exelusive , but is expressly made concurrent with such remedies as may be given by-state laws.
But the true reason -why the admiralty powers of the federal
courts began now to be exercised for the first time in the inland
waters was this: The decision in the case of The Genesee Ohief,
having removed the imaginary line of tide-water which had been
supposed to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts,
there existed no longer any reason why the general admiralty
powers conferred on all the District Courts by the ninth section
of the Judiciary Act (1 U. S. Statutes 77) should not- be exercised wherever there was navigation ,which could give rise to
admiralty and'maritime causes. The Congress 'which framed
that act-the first assembled under the Constitution-seemed to
recognise this more extended view of the jurisdiction in admiralty by placing under its control cases of seizure of vessels
under the laws of impost, navigation, and trade of the United
States, when those seizures were made in waters navigable from
the sea by vessels of ten tons burden or upwards..
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The case of -The Mlagnolia, 20 How. 296, is another important
case in the line of decisions which we have been considering. It
was a case of collision occurring on the Alabama river, far above
the ebb and flow of the tide, on a stream whose course was wholly
within the limits of the state which bears its name. This was
thought to present an occasion when the doctrines announced in
the case of The Genesee Chief might properly be reconsidered
and modified, if not overruled. Accordingly we find that the
argument in favor of the" main proposition decided in that case
was restated with much force in the opinion of the court, and that
a very elaborate opinion was delivered on behalf of three dissenting judges.. The principles established by the case of The
Genesee Chief were thus reaffirmed after a careful and full
reconsideration. It was also further decided (which is pertinent
to the case before us) that the jurisdiction in admiralty on the
great western rivers did not depend upon the Act of February 3d
1845, but that it was founded on the Act of September 24th
1789. That decision was made ten years ago, and the jurisdiction, thus firmly established, has been largely administered by
all the District Courts of the United States ever since without
question.
At the same time the state courts have been in the habit of
adjudicating causes, which in the nature of their subject-matter
are identical in'every sense with causes which are acknowledged
to be of admiralty and maritime cogiisance; and .theyhave in
these causes administered remedies which differ-in no essential
respect, from the remedies which have heretofore been considered
as peculiar to admiralty courts. This authority has been exercised
.under state statutes, and not under any claim of a general common-law power in these courts to such a jurisdiction.
It is a little singular that at this term of the court we should,
for the first time, have the question of the right of the state courts
to exercise this jurisdiction, raised by two writs of error to state
courts, remote from each other, the one relating t6 a contract to
be performed on the Pacific Ocean, and the, other to a collision on
the Mississippi river. The first of these cases, Tho Moses Tay/lor,
had been decided before the present case was submitted to our
consideration.
The main point ruled in that case is, that the jurisdiction conferred by the Act of 1789 on the District Courts, in civil causes
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of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is exclusive by its express
terms, and that this exclusion extends to the state courts. The
language of the 9th section of the act admits of no other interpretation. It says, after describing the criminal jurisdiction conferred on the District Courts, that they "shall also have exclusive
original cognisance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impoit, navigation, or trade of the United States, when the seizures are made on
waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more
tons burden." If the Congress of the United States has the
right, in providing for the exercise of the admiralty powers, to
which the Constitution declares the authority of the Federal judiciary shall extend, to make that jurisdiction exclusive, then
undoubtedly it has done so by this act. This branch of the subject has been so fully discussed in the opinion of'the court in the
case just referred to, that it is unnecessary to consider it further
in this place.
It must be taken, therefore, as the settled law of this court, that
wherever the District Courts of the United States have original
cognisance of admiralty causes by virtue of the Act of 1789, that
cognisance is exclusive, aid no other court, state or national, can
exercise it, with the exception always of such. concurrent remedy
as is given by the common law.
This examination of the cases already decided by this court
establishes clearly the following propositions :1. The admiralty jurisdiction to which the power of the Federal
judiciary is by the Constitution declared to extend is not-limitedto tide-water, but covers the entire navigable waters of the United
States.
2. The original jurisdiction in admiralty exercised by the District Courts by virtue of the Act of 1789, is exclusive, not only
of other Federal courts but of the state courts also.
3. The jurisdiction of admiralty causes, arising on the interior
waters of the United States, other than the lakes and their connecting waters, is conferred by the Act of September 24th
1789.
4. The admiralty jurisdiction exercised by the same courts on
the lakes and the waters connecting those lakes, is governed by
the Act of February 3d 1845.
If the facts of the case before us in this record constitute a"
VoL. XV -38
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cause of admirhlty cognisance, then the remedy by a direct proceeding against the vessel belonged to *theFederal courts alone,
and was excluded from the state tribunals.
It was a case of collision between two steamboats. The case
of The lagnolia, 20 Howard, to which we have before referredi
was a case of this character, and many others have been decided
in this court since that time. That they were admiralty causes has
never been doubted.
We thus see that every principle which is necessary to a decision of this case has been already established by this court in
previous cases. They lead unavoidably to the conclusion that the
state courts of Iowa acted without jurisdiction; that the law of
that state attempting to confer this jurisdiction is void, because it
is in conflict with the Act of Congress of September 24th 1789,
and *that this act is well authorized by the Constitution of the
United States. Unless we are prepared to retract the principles
'established by the entire series of decisions of this court on that
subject, from and including, the case of The Genesee Chief, down
to that of Te Moses Taylor, decided at this term, we cannot
escape this conclusion. The, succeeding cases are in reality but
the necessary complement and result of the principles decided in
the case of The Genesee Ohief. The propositions laid down there,
and which were indispensable to sustain the judgment in that case,
bring us logically to the judgment which we must render in this
case. With the doctrine of that case on the subject of"the extent
of the admiralty jurisdiction we are satisfied, and should be disposed to affirm them now if they were open to controversy.
It may be well here to advert to one or two considerations to
which our attention has been called, but which did not admit of
notice in the course of observation which we have been pursuing
without breaking the sequence of the argument.
1. It is said there is nothing in the record to show that the Ad.
Hine was of ten tons burden or upwards, and that, therefore, the
case is not brought within the jurisdiction of. the Federal courts.
The observation is made, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Iowa, in reference to the provision of the Act of 1845, which that
court supposed to confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts in the
present case, if it had such juri3diction at all. We have already
shown that the jurisdiction is founded on the Act of 1789. That
act also speaks of vessels of ten tons burden and upwards, but
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not in the same connection that the Act of 1845 does. In the
latter act it is made essential to the jurisdiction that the vessel
which is the subject of the contract, or the tort, should be enrolled
and licensed for the coasting trade, and should be of twenty tons
burden or upwards. In the Act of 1789 it is declared that the
District Courts shall have jurisdiction in admiralty of seizures for
violations of certain laws, where such seizures are made on rivers
navigable by vessels of ten tons burden or upwards from the sea.
In the latter case the phrase is used as.describing the carrying
capacity of-the river where the seizure is made. In the former
case it relates to the capacity of the vessel itself.
2. It is said that the statute of Iowa may be fairly construed
as coming within the clause of the 9th section of the Act of 1789,
which " saves to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it."
. But the remedy pursued in the Iowa courts in the case before
us is in no sense a common-law remedy. It is a remedy partaking
of all the essential features -of an admiralty proceeding -in rem.
The statute provides that the vessel may be sued and made defendant without any proceeding against the owners or even mentioning
their names. That a writ may be issued and the vessel seized on
filing a petition similar in substance to a libel. That after a notice
in the nature of a monition, the vessel may be condemned and an
order made for her sale if the liability is established for which
she was sued. Such is the general character of the steamboat
laws of the Western States.
While the proceeding differs thus from a common-law remedy,"
it is also essentially different from what are in the West called
suits by attachment, and in some of the older states foreign attachments. In these cases there is a suit against a personal defendant
by name, and because of inability to serve process on him on
account of non-residence, or for some other reason mentioned in
the various statutes allowing attachments to issue, the suit is commenced by a writ directing the proper officer to attach .sufficient
property of the defendant to answer any judgment which may be
rendered against him. This proceeding may -be had against an
owner or part owner of a vessel, and his interest thus subjected
to sale in a common-law court of the 'state.
Such actions may also be maintained in personam against a.
defendant in the common-law courts, as the common law gives;
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all in consistence with the grant of admiralty powers in the 9th
section of the Judiciary Act.
But it could not have been the intention of Congress by the
exception in that section to give the suitor all such remedies as
I. ight afterwards be enacted ly state statutes, for this would have
enabled the states to make the jurisdiction of their courts concurrent in all cases, by simply providing a statutory remedy for all
cases. Thus the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts
would be defeated. In the Act of 1845, where Congress does
mean this, the language expresses it clearly ; for after saving to
the parties in cases arising under that act a right of trial by jury
and the right to a concurrent remedy at common law, where it is
competent to give it, there is added "any concurrent remedy
which may be given by the state laws where such steamer or other
vessel is employed."
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
Supreme Court of Iowa, with directions that it be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
Among the latest causes decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States
at the term recently adjourned, was the
one in which this opinion was given.
"When we consider the great extent of our
navigable waters ; the vast number of
steamboats and vessels navigating them;
that our inland commerce, great as it
has already become, is yet in its infancy, we are impressed with the magnitude and extent of the interests affected
by the judgment of the court in this
case; and are led t, ths belief, that
tbi high tribunal has rarely been called
upon to adjudicate a question, purely
civil in its nature, of mure commanding
importance and far-reaching consequcnces.
The auestion involved is by the decision put at rest, 'and it is not proposed
to enter upon an examination of the
various positions taken in the opinion,
and upon the correctness of which depends the soundness of the conclusion
reached.
It is evident that many questions will

yet arise under the various statutes of
the states respecting proceedings against
boats and vessels.
Many of these questions will turn
upon the inquiry, what constitutes a
cause of admiralty coguisance ?
The foregoing opinion holds that cases
of collision between steamboats on the
navigable rivers of the'United States,
though the collision occurs above tidewater, are of admiralty jurisdiction
where the remedy is by a direct proceeding against the boat and not against the
owners. State statutes of the character
in question embrace, however, cases
which would not be of admiralty cognisauce, and to this extent would not be
invalid. The provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of the
Act of Congress applicable to the inquiry
before the court, sufficiently appear in
the above opinion. Forthe sake of convenience, and to enable the scope of the
decision to be more plainly perceived,
we quote the substance of the statute of
Iowa which was held invalid so far as
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it authorized proceedings in rem in cases
of collision between steamboats on the
navigable rivers of the state.
The statute (Revision of Iowa, chap.
148) enacts that ( 3693) any boat
found in the waters of this state is
liable :
1. For all debts contracted by the
master, owner, agent, clerk or consignee
thereof on account of supplies furnished
for the use of such boat; on account of
work done or services rendered for such
boat; or on account of work done or
materials furnished in building, repairing, fitting out, furnishing, or equipping
such boat.
2. For all demands or damages accruing from the non-performance or iealperformance of any contract of affreightmen, or any contract relative to the
transportation of persons or property,
entered into by the master, owner,
agent, clerk, or consignee thereof.
3. For all injuries to person or property by such boat, or by the officers or
crew, done in connection with the business of said boat.
§ 3694. Claims growing out of any of
the above causes are liens upon the boat,
furniture, barges and lighters.
3695. Such liens take preference
of any claims against the boat itself, or
any or all of its owners, growing out of
any other causes than those above en:cmerated, and as between themselves are
to be preferred in the following order.
1. Those for services rendered on
board within a year.
2. Those arising from contracts made
within the state.
3. All other causes.
3698. Extends the remedy to rafts.
3701. The petition must be sworn
to and filed with the clerk or justice of
the peace, who shall thereupon issue a
warrant to the proper officer, commanding him to seize the boat, and detain the
same until released by due course of
law.
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3703. The usual original notice
shall also be issued, directed to the boat
by name, and served upon the master,
owner, agent, clerk, orconsignee thereof,
or if none can be found, by posting up
a copy on the boat.
3705. Any person interested in the
boat may appear and defend.
§ 3706. The boat may be discharged
at any time before final judgment by
bond with sureties, the bond to be conditioned that the obligors will pay the
amount which may be found due to the
plaintiff, with costs.
J 3707-8. Authorize sale of boat
on execution, and regulate the mode.
3711. The provisions of this chapter do not affect the right of the plaintiff to sue in any other manner.
§ 3712. In allactions commenced
under this chapter, it is sufficient to
allege the contract to have been made
with the boat itself.
The decision of the Supreme Court of
Iowa, which was reversed by the principal
case, is reported in 17 Iowa Rep. 349.
Th* concurrent jurisdictien of the state
courts was distinctly asserted by the
Supreme Court of Ohio, under a similar
statute in an action against a steamboat
for materials, labour, and supplies in the
building and repairing' of the same.
Thompson v. Steamboat ,"JuliusD. Morton," 2 Ohio St. Rep. 26 (1853). It.
was there held that the object of the water
craft law was to provide a convenient
and efficient remedy, by subjecting the
boat or vessel itself to seizure, and to
avoid the difficulty of ascertaining and
proceeding against the owners, and that
the remedy it gave furnished no sound
reason for holding the jurisdiction of the
United States Courts to be exclusive.
S. P. more fully examined, see Keating
v. Spink, 3 Id. 105, and cases and
authorities cited. The cases in Federal
courts respecting the nature and extent
of admiralty jurisdiction, are collected,
conveniently arranged and accurately di-
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(J9urt Qf Appeals of New York.
KIMBALL EXECUTOR OF LE ROY, v. CONNOLLY.
The county clerk is liable for damages resulting from errors and mistakes in his
searches.
But the damages must be the direct consequence of such error or mistake.
Where the purchaser of the search takes na action, parts-with nothing of value,
and is put in no worse condition by relying upon the search than he was before,
he has no claim for damages.
A., being the owner of a house, purchased a certificate of search for the purpose
of showing her own title, and getting a loan of money. The clerk neglected to
note on the search, a judgment against a former owner of the house, which was
still a valid lien, and would probably have been paid off if it had been noted, and
thus presented to the attention ofA., who was ignorant of-it. The purpose of A.
was accomplished, but subsequently the house was sold under execution issued upon
the judgment omitted by the clerk. Held, that the damage was not the direct consequence of the clerk's negligence, and he was not liable.

APPEAL from an order of the Supreme Court, at general term,
in the first district, reversing a judgment rendered at the circuit,
on a trial before a justice of that court, without a jury, and
granting a new trial, with costs to abide the event. The plaintiff,
at the said trial, recovered judgment for $474.98 dani.ges against
the said defendant, for neglecting, in his official capacity, as clerk
of the city and county of New York, to return to a requisition
for a search for judgments. in his office, as such clerk, against
Moses Le Roy, a certain judgment for $26.97, in favour of Nelson Smith, against the said Moses, docketed in his office, and
constituting a lien upon certain premises in the city of New
York, owned by Ellen Le Roy; deceased, of whom the plaintiff is
the executor.
It appears from the conclusions of fact, certified by. the judge
who tried the action, that the judgment was docketed in the said
clerk's office, against Moses Le Roy, on the 6th day of February
1857, and then became a lien upon a house and lot of land known
as No. 269 East Twelfth street, in the city of New York, of
vwhich the said Mvse- oan the owner ; that the said Mo-ics con-
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veyed the said premises to the said Ellen Le Roy, in her lifetime,
on the 30th day of March, following; and that she continued to
be the owner thereof until her death, which occurred in December
1858. She applied in August 1858 to the Jefferson Insurance
Company for a loan of money upon the security of the said
premises; and for the purpose of an examination of her title, a
lawyer was employed, to be paid by her, who was to prepare an
abstract of the title for the satisfaction of the insurance company.
The lawyer delivered a written requisition, in pursuance of his
employment, to the defendant, in his official capacity, requiring
him to search for judgments against Moses Le Roy, including the
time when the said judgment became a lien; that the defendant,
as such clerk, returned, on the 3d day of September 1858, certain
encumbrances, but wholly omitted to return the said judgment for
$26.97, which was then a valid and subsisting lien; that the
defendant was paid his fee for the said search, by the said Ellen;
that she obtained a loan of $4000 from the said insurance company upon the security of a mortgage, eiecuted by' her upon the
said premises,'and upon the faith of the certificate of the defendant, as such clerk, to the existence of such judgments only as he
had returned upon the said search; that the money, as far as
necessary, was applied to the satisfaction of the liens against the
said premises, so returned, and there was more than sufficient to
satisfy them, and also the said judgment for $26.97 ; that in July
1858, Nelson Smith issued an execution on his said judgment
against Moses Le Roy for $26.97, by virtue of which the said
premises were sold by the'sheriff of the city and county of New
York, on the 8th day of September 1858, to the said Smith, as.
purchaser, for the sum of $60; the premises were not redeemed,
and the said sheriff executed a conveyance to Smith on the 10th
day of December 1859, which passed the whole title owned by
the said Moses at the time of the docketing of the judgment.
The purchaser, Smith, by virtue of his title so obtained, instituted summary proceedings before a justice of the peace, and
entered into full possession of the premises on the 30th day of
December 1859. The plaintiff, as the executor of the said Ellen
Le Roy, who died in December 1858, made an amicable settlement with Nelson Smith, who conveyed the said premises to the
plaintiff as'executor and trustee, under the will of the said Ellen,
for the consideration of $400, on the 29th of March, 1860, which
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was the lowest gum for which a reconveyance could be obtained,
the premises then being worth $6000. The judge also found that
the plaintiff was ignorant of the judgment, and of the sheriff's
sale, until Smith had obtained the title; and that the said Ellen
was ignorant that the judgment was a lien upon the premises:
The evidence shows that she knew of the existence of the judgment before Smith took any proceedings to sell the premises
under his judgment and execution.
The judge found, as a.conclusion of law, that the plain.;ff was
entitled to recover from the defendant the said sum of ;,400, so
paid to obtain a reconveyance, together with interest, ai,,Dunting
in all to the sum of $474.98, for which sum the plaia;iff had
judgment.
The defendant excepted to the findings of the judg , both as
to the facts and the conclusion of law. The General Term of
the Supreme Court, upon appeal, as before stated, reversed this
judgment, and awarded a new trial, with costs to abide the event.
The plaintiff appeals from the order of the General Term, and
stipulates that, if the order be affirmed on this appeal, judgment
absolute shall be rendered against him.
B. ff. U derhill, for the-appellant.
Ukarles H. Glover, for the respondent.
LEONAILD, J.-An act of the legislature, passed in 1858 (Session Laws, p. 265), provides that the county clerk shall have a
sufficient number of competent searchers in his office ; shall caum e
searches, when ordered, to be made without delay ; shall -ertify
to the corroctness of his searches, and shall be held legally liable
for all damages resulting from errors, inaccuracies, or mist: kes in
his return. The plaintiff insists that this statute casts uon the
defendant a legal liability for the loss sustained by the es:-t
,f
his testatrix.
If that loss is the direct consequence of'the omission f tI.
defendant to return the judgment against Moses Le I 3y .1
favor of Smith, the position if the plaintiff is sound. It is
impossible, however, to hold tD ouch a conclusion. Mrs. Le Roy
took no action ia consequence of the omission in th( clerk's
return to the search. She bought no property, and parted with
nothing of value by reason of the erroneous return. The insur-
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ance company might have been subjected to damage by the loss
of the security upon which they were induced to part with their
money, relying upon the. accuracy of the defendant's return.
But that is not the case of Mrs. Le Roy. Her loss occurred
from the non-payment of the judgment, and not from the error
in the clerk's return. She obtained the loan for which she
applied, and nothing was abated from it on account of this
encumbrance. It was no injury of which she can complain to
have the money paid to herself on effecting the loan, instead of
having some part of it applied to the satisfaction of an outstanding judgment.
However probable it may be that the judgment would have
been paid off by the insurance company out of the proceeds of
the loan, if it had been returned upon the search,- it is impossible
to declare at this time that it would have certainly been so
applied. Her object in causing the search to be made was not
defeated by the omission to return the judgment. She did not
seek information about her 'title for any purpose but that of
obtaining the loan. It is no ground.of complaint that she was
not awakened by the return to take action for the removal of this
judgment. The knowledge which she would have derived from
the return of it would have been merely incidental; and it is uncertain whether the return, or the knowledge thereby acquired, would
have been applied by Airs. Le Roy to any purpose whatever. No
one can say what actually would have been done under a different
state of facts from those which actually occurred. It is no answer
to say that she could, or that she might, have paid the judgment,
or prevented a sale; it does not make it certain that it wouldhave been done. The payment was not a necessary consequence
of a correct return by the clerk; and, without such a direct and
necessary result, to flow from his act or omission, the defendant
cannot be made chargeable with damages.
The rule as to damages, under this statute, is not different from
that prescribed by the common law. When the damages are
uncertain, indefinite, and incapable of being fixed, as the result
of an act, negligence, or omission, none can be imposed. Had a
different rule been contemplated by the legislature, it would have
been necessary to have imposed a fixed penalty ; but the statute
leaves it open to such damages as flow from the error, inaccuracy,-
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or mistak' of the clerk, and can be ascertained to have been
actually sustained.
The ordel appealed from should be affirmed, with costs, and the
judgment be made absolute against the plaintiff.
All the judges concurring,
Judgment accordingly.

S'upreme 6ourt of Indiana.
JACOB KANTROWITZ et al. v. HANNAH PRATHER et al.
Debts contracted by the wife on the faith of her separate estate are not, in a legal
sense, an encumbrance upon such separate estate, and are, therefore, not embraced
in the restriction of the statute of Indiana, which provides, that the wife shall have
n o power to encumber or convey lands constituting her separate estate, "except
by deed in which her husband shall join."

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
GREGORY, J.-Suit by the appellants against the appellees.
The complaint is as follows :The plaintiffs, Jacob Kantrowitz
and Nathan Kantrowitz, complain of Hannah Prather, defendant
herein, and say that said defendant is now, and has been for four
years last past, the wife of her co-defendant, Allen W. Prather,
who is also made party hereto; that said Hannah is now and has
been continually for the four years last past, seised in her own
right, and for her sole use and benefit, of lot No. 32 in Sims &
Fidley's addition to the city of Columbus, in said county, of the
value of $4000, and that the said defendant Hannah is indebted
to plaintiffs in the sum of $386.45, for necessary goods, wares, and
merchandise, sold and delivered by said plaintiffs, as said firm, to
said defendant, Hannah, at her special instance and request, a
bill of particulars of which is filed herewith, and made part
hereof. The said goods were sold, and credit given to said Hannah on the faith of her said separate property, and not otherwise,
the payment of which said indebtedness is a charge upon the
separate property of said Hannah. Said indebtedness is due and
unpaid.
I We are indebted for the following opinion to the Hon. R. 0. G
Am. LAW REG.

GOnr.-:EDs.
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"1The articles farnished by plaintiffs to defendant were articles
suitable to a person in her station in life, and the credit was given to
her exclusively, her husband having no property subject to execution at or during the time the articles were being furnished. Wherefore plaintiffs pray the court for a finding of the amount due from
said wife to them, and a decree charging her said separate property with the payment thereof, with costs, and also a decree and
order directing her said separate property to be sold to satisfy
said finding and costs; or, if more consistent with equity, to order
the rents thereof to be applied, and all other proper relief."
The bill of particulars filed with the complaint shows that the
goods furnished the wife were mainly female wearing apparel.
The defendants demurred jointly and separately to the complaint:1st. That the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter
of the action.
2d. The improper joinder of said Hannah and her said husband as defendants.
3d. That the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The court below sustained the demurrers as to the 3d cause, and
overruled them as to the 1st and 2d.
Final judgment on demurrer for the appellees.
There are no cross-errors assigned, but it is perhaps not improper for us to say that "want of jurisdiction, had there been anything in it, should have been taken advantage of by motion to
transfer the case to the Circuit Court: 2 G. & H. p. 22, § 11."
But the court had jurisdiction. Title to real estate was not the
issue, it was only an incident: Wolcott v. righton, 7 Ind. 44;.
Holliday v. Spencer, 7 Ind. 632; Carpenter v. FVanscoten, 20
Ind. 50. In no event could it have been made an issue but by
sworn answer denying title. The parties defendant were not
improperly joined: 2 G. & H. p. 41-2, § 8, 9; Martindale v.
Tibetts, 16 Ind. 200. Is the separate estate of the wife liable
in equity for debts contracted for her benefit upon the credit of it?
Until the ruling in Yale v. Dederer, 22 New York 450, it
seemed to be well settled in New York that a married woman,
having a separate. estate, might bind it by her general engagements to pay debts contracted for the benefit of such estate, or on
her own account, or for her benefit, upon the credit of it: JrTthodist Episcopal OhurcA v. Jaques, 3 Johns. Ch. 77 ; s. c. in Court

KANTROWITZ v. PRATHER.

of Errors, 17 Johns. 548; North American Coal Co. v. ]Jyott,
7 Paige 9; s. c. in Court of Errors, 20 Wend. 570; Gardner
v. Gardner, 7 Paige 112; s. c. in Court of Errors, 22 Wend.
526; Curtis v. Fngel, 2 Sandf. Ch. 287 ; Yale v. Dederer, 18.
New York 265.
In England it is held that she may not only bind her separate
property by a general engagement, written or parol, for her own
benefit, or that of her estate: Murray v. Barlie5 8 Mylne &
Keene's Oh. R. 209; Owens v. Dickenson, 1 Craig & Phillips'
Ch. R. 48; but thai she can do so by the execution of a bond
as surety for her husband: 3 Atk. 69; ifume v. Tenant and
his Wife, 1 Brown's Ch. R. 16 ; and for a stranger, 15 Yesey 596.
In Todd v. Lee and Another, 15 Wis. 365, Chief Justice
Dixon, in delivering the opinion of the court, reviewed the cases
bearing on this question with marked ability, approving the ruling
ih Yale v. Dederer,18 N. Y. 265, and disapproving the ruling
in the same case in 22 N. Y. 450.
Lord Chancellor COTTENHAM, in the late case of Owens v.
.Dickenson, supra, put this question, perhaps on its true foundation, in holding that the general engagements of a married woman
are enforced by a court of equity against her separate estate, not
as executions of a power of appointment, but on the principle,
that, to whatever extent she has, by the terms of the settlement,
the power of dealing with her separate -property, she has also the
other power, incident to property in general, namely., the power
of contracting debts to be paid out of it.
But, without ruling as to the extent of the power of a married
woman over her separate estate by way of charging it with debts
contracted by her, we think, on the weight of authority, that a
court of equity will give execution against her separate estate,
not only for debts created for the benefit of such estate (Major
v. Symmes, 19 Ind. 117), but for her own benefit in her support.
In Major v. Symmes, supra, this court held, that the clause of
the statute forbidding a married woman to encumber or convey
her real estate, except by deed, in which her husband shall join,
relates to sudh direct acts of conveyance or encumbrance as previously required the consent of the husband to perfect. In Cox's
Administratorv. Wood et al., 20 Ind. 54, PERKINS, J., seemed
to think that under the statute a married woman, by her separate
contracts, might encumber or charge her real estate, and her per-
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sonal property acquired by devise, descent, or gift, to the extent
of the use and income arising therefrom, but no further, except
for the purchase-money for real estate.
This question was not involved in that case, and all the remarks
made on the subject are the dicta of the judge, and not the rulings
of this court.
But in Moore and Others v. McMillen, 23 Ind. 78, the case
of Cox's Administrator v. Wood et at., supra, is cited as

authority.
But a charge on the future'rents and profits of real estate would
be an encumbrance on the land.
The views expressed in the latter case therefore cannot be sustained either by reason or authority.
The statute provides that "1no lands of auy married woman shall
be liable for the debts of her husband, but such lands and the
profits therefrom shall be her separateproperty, as fully -as if
she was unmarried: Provided, that such wife shall have no

power to encumber or convey such lands, except by deed, in
which her husband shall join." This proviso is a limitation only
on the mode of disposition of the wife's separate estate. The
general provision would unidoubtedly confer on her the power of
disposition, as well as enjoyment, for the former is necessary to
the latter. The restriction would not cover a disposition by will.
The words "encumber" and "convey" have each a well defined
meaning. And the only question is, are debts created by the
wife, on the credit of her separate estate, an encumbrance within
the meaning of the statute-?
The idea of regarding the estate of the wife in her separate.
property, as in the nature of a trust for her support, and that she
can only charge it by virtue of a power given her for that purpose, which has led to so much discussion and confusion, both in
England and this country, is a mere fiction, and as such has been
abandoned. in England in the recent case (March 1861) of Johnson v:. Gallagher, 7 London Jur. N. S. 273. Lord Justice
TURNER there said: "The doctrine of appointment, however,
seems to me to be exploded hy Owens v. Dickinson, 1 Or. & Ph.
48. A court of equity having created the separate estate, has
enabled a married woman to contract debts in respect of it.
Her person cannot be made liable either at law or in equity, but
in equity her property may. This court, therefore, as I con:
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ceive, gives execution against the property, just as a court of
law gives execution against the property of other debtors."
Judge REDFIELD, in a note to the case of Todd v. Lee, supra, 1
Am. Law Reg. p. 665, says of this decision, that "This view of
the law is given by one of the ablest and most experienced equity
judges now living, and upon a full review of all the English
cases, and we.must confess that it seems to us to have stripped
the matter of much of its former complication and confusion, and
to be far inore satisfactory than any other view which we have
yet seen." We think, at least, that the debts contracted by the
wife are in no legal sense an encumbrance on her separate estate,
and therefore not embraced in the restriction on her. power of
disposition contained in the proviso.
The court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the
complaint.
Judgment reversed with costs;. cause remanded with
directions to overrule the demurrer to the complaint,
and for further proceedings.

Supreme, Court of California.
WHEELER v. SAN FRANCISCO AND ALAMEDA RAILROAD
COMPANY.*
A ferry-boat or other means to cross a body of water on the line of a railroad,
whether in the middle or at the end of the route, is part of the necessary property
of the railroad; and the company is liable for neglect to carry a passenger across
this, as well as any other part of the route.
It is settled that a railroad company may contract to carry passengers or freight
beyond its own route, and the liability as a common carrier continues through the
whole distance contracted for.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
SAWYER, J.-This is an action brought against the defendant
as a common carrier of passengers and freight, to recover damages
sustained by plaintiff in consequence of a breach of duty on the
part of defendant in refusing to carry the plaintiff across the bay
of San Francisco to the city of San Francisco from the defendant's wharf, at the terminus of its railroad, in the county of
Alameda, in a steamer under the control of defendant, which ran
regularly between the said points in connection with the regular
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trains on said railroad. The fact that said defendant was, at the
time, a common carrier of passengers and freight for hire over
the whole of said route, and the duty to carry, are alleged in
broad terms. But it is also alleged that defendant is a corporation, organized and existing under the statute of the state, entitled
"An act to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies,
and the management of the affairs thereof, and other matters
relating thereto," approved May 20th 1861.
Defendant having demurred to the complaint on the ground
that the facts stated are insufficient to constitute a cause of action,
the demurrer was sustained and judgment entered for defendant.
Plaintiff appealed.
As we understand respondent's counsel, it is conceded that the
facts, broadly stated, considered literally as they appear upon the
face of the complaint, are sufficient, as they undoubtedly are; but
it is claimed that, as the statute under which the corporation is
formed appears on the face of the complaint, and as thereby "the
character of the defendant, and its functions, and the general
scope of its powers, also appear, the court can determine, notwithstanding the other strong averments, whether the law did impose
the duty on'the defendant, and that the other averments will turn
out to be merely conclusions of law wrongfully alleged."
The point of the 'demurrer is, that the defendant is a corpora-.
tion for the purpose of building and operating a railroad only,
with no power or authority to build, own, or control a steamboat;
that the acts complained of were committed on the steamboat and
not on the railroad; that dn that part of the line the defendant
had no power to act or become liable as a common carrier; and
that, as the corporation had no capacity to become a common carrier by steamboat, there could be no duty to carry the plaintiff by
steamboat, and consequently no breach of duty arising out of the
acts alleged in the complaint. In short, that in consequence of a
want of power to bqcome a carrier over the part of the route traversed by steamboat, the essential facts alleged are legally impossible, and, therefore, cannot constitute a cause of action. The
defendant is alleged to be a common carrier of passengers and
freight over this part of the line, as well as on the railroad, which
is only continued to the wharf whence the steamboat starts. But,
if by the law of its organization referred to in the complaint, the
defendant had no legal capacity to contract to convey passengerS
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across the bay 9f San Francisco from the wharf of the defendant
to the city of San Francisco, then the demurrer was properly sustained, notwithstanding the averment, and this question of power
is the only point to be determined.
The act under which defendant was incorporated confers the
powers generally and ordinarily conferred by similar acts upon
corporations organized to build and operate railroads in the various states of the Union, with no special restrictions affecting the
question: Laws of 1861, 615, §§ 3,17 ; Hittell's Gen. Laws, par.
826, et 8eq. The second subdivision of § 17 authorizes the defendant: " To receive, hold, take, &c., as a natural person might
or could do, &c., real estate and other property of every description, &c., to aid" and encourage the construction, maintenance,
and accommodation of such rairoad." And the third subdivision
authorizes it: "1To purchase, &c., all such lands, real estate, and
other property as the directors may deem necessary and proper
for the construction and maintenance of said railroad, &c., and
other accommodations and purposes deemed necessary to accomplish the objects for which the corporation is created." The fifth
subdivision authoizes such companies: " To construct their roads
across, along, or upon any stream of water, watercourses, roadstead, bay, navigable stream," &c. The sixth subdivision : " To
cross, intersect, join, and unite its railroad with any other railroad, either before or after constructed, &c., with necessary turnouts, &c., and other conveniences in frtherance of the objects
of its connections," &c. ; and the eighth subdivigioR confers
authority " to receive by perchase, &c., any lands or other property of any description, and to hold and convey the same in any
manner the directors may. think proper, the -same as natural persons might or could do, that may be necessary for the construction
and maintenance of said road, &c., or for-any other purpose necessary for the conveniences of such companies, in order to transact
the business usual for such railroad companies."
We will first consider the question on the hypothesis that
defendant's route terminates at its wharf, and not 'at the city of
San Francisco,.as its name would seem to indicate, and that it
does not own the steamer running from the wharf to San Francisco, or control that portion of the line. On this hypothesis, the
first question is, had the defendant any capacity to contract to
convey passengers and freight beyond the wharf-the terminus of
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its line-to the city of San Francisco. It has long been settled
by judicial decisions, both in England and the United States,
under similar acts, that railroad companies may contract to carry
passengers and freight beyond their own routes. So far as we
are aware, with the exception of a single state (Connecticut), the
decisions in England and the several states of the Union have
been uniform in favor of the power. Redfield, in his able work
on Railways, states the result of the decisions thus: "It was for
many.years regarded as perfectly settled law, that a common carrier, which was a corporation chartered for the purposes of transportation of .goods and passengers between certain points, might
enter into a valid contract to carry goods delivered to them for
that purpose beyond their own limits. Most of the American
cases do not regard the accepting a parcel marked for a destination
beyond The terminus of the route of the first carrier as primdfacic
evidence of an undertaking to carry through to that point. But
the English cases do so construe the implied duty resulting from
the receipt. But the cases, until a very recent one, do hold that
a railroad company may assume to carry goods to any point to
which their general business extends, Whether within or without
the particular state or country of their locality. And it has
generally been considered, both in this country and in the
English courts, that receiving goods destined beyond the terminus
of the particular railway, and accepting the carriage through,
and giving a ticket or check through, does import an undertaking
to carry through, and that this contract is binding upon the company :" Id. 288. He then refers to the single case holding a
contrary doctrine (Hood v. _N. Y. & N. H. Railroad, 22 Conn..
502, in which there was a divided court), and vindicates the rule
as established by the great weight of authority. The following
are some of the cases which support the rule as stated: Mufs-.
champ v. L. & P. Railway, 8 M. & W. 421; Watson v. Amber
gate, Xat. & Boston Railway, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 497; Scotthorn
v. South Staff. Railway, 18 Id. 553; Wilson v. Y. N. J"
B.
Railway, Id. 557; Crouch v. London . N. W. Railway, 25 Id.
287 ; Collins v. Bristol & Ex. Railway, 36 Id. 482; Weed v.
Sar. J Seh. Railroad Co., 19 Wend. 534; Bar. & Mech. Bank
v. Champ. Trans. Ca., 23 Vt. 186 ; Noyes v. Rut. & Bur. Railroad Co., 27 Id. 110; Kyle v. Laurens Railroad Co., 10 Richardson 382; Angle v. Miss. & M. Railroad Ca., 9 Iowa 488;
VOL. XV.-39
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Schroeder v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 5 Duer 61 ; Hart v.
Bes. & Sar. Railroad Co., 4 Seld. 37 ; Fitclurg.. Worces. Bailroad Co. v. Hanna, 6 Gray 539; N. Y., Alb. &- Buf. Tel. Co.
v. De Butte, 5 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 407; Perkins v. Port
S'o J Ports. Railroad Co., 47 Maine 573. In Noyes v. B. &
B. Railroad Co., REDFIELD, C. J., says: 1 It now seems to be
well settled that railroad companies, as common carriers, may
make valid contracts to carry beyond the limits of their own road,
either by land or water, and thus become liable for the acts and
neglects of other carriers, in no sense under their control :" 27
Vt. 111.
In Perkins v. P. S. & P. Railroad Co., 47 Maine. 573, the
contract was by a railroad company in the state of Maine, to
delivier packages of goods at Bloomington, in the state of Illinois.
The court held it competent for. the corporation to make such a
contract. In the opinion the court says: 1 Upon a careful survey of all the authorities, we are satisfied that a railroad company
may be bound, by special contract, to transport persons or property beyond the line of their own road. In granting the
charter, all incidental powers which are necessary to the proper
and profitable exercise of those which are specially enumerated may
be presumed to be conferred by implication. The business of
common carriers between the different places is intimately interwoven, branching off into innumerable channels. And it is often
of great public convenience, if not of absolute necessity, that
several companies should combine their operationd, and thus
transport passengers and merchandise by a mutual arrangement
over all their lines, upon one contract, for one price. In such
cases each is held liable for the whole distance: Tairchild v.
Slocum, 19 Wend. 329; F. & IF. Railroad Co. v. Hanna, 6
Gray 539. And we think a company may be bound, even without any actual arrangement with the connecting lines, if, by their
agents, they hold them selvesodt to the public as common carriers
to a place beyond the limits of their own road."
However forcible the reasons might seem for a more limited
construction of the powers of corporations in this respect under
the ordinary acts authorizing the organization of railway companies, if the question were a new one, we should not feel authorized to disregard such an almost unbroken array of authorities.
The interests, both of the companies and the public, are, doubt-
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less, also best subserved by the construction established. With
respect to the English cases, some of the later ones might, perhaps, if necessary, have been aided by an express provision of a
statute (8 Victoria), to which we shall have occasion to refer, but
the leading case of Muschamp v. Lancaster & Prest.rn Railroad,
and some others, were decided before the passag of the act
referred to; and they seem to have been decided wholly independent of any statutory provision- In none of the American
cases does this statute appear to have been noticed.
It is insisted, however, by the respondent, that the cases of
the class cited are all upon express contracts to carry beyond
the route of the company; that, at least, it was optional with
the parties whether to contract to carry and deliver beyond
the termini of their respective roads; that they -did so expressly
contract, and thereby voluntarily assumed the liability beyond
that which the law imposed on them as carriers over their own
roads ; and that for this reason the cases are not authorities in
which the'defendant exercised its option and
the case at bar, ifi
refused to contract to carry beyond its own road, or to assume
responsibilities beyond those which the law imposed on it as a
carrier to the end of its route. But we have seen that it was
competent for the defendant to contract in the character of a common carrier of passengers and freight beyond the terminus of the
road. And the complaint avers that the defendant is a common
carrier over the whole line. If the defendant is competent to
contract for the whole distance in the character of a common
carrier, without reference to the termination of its road, and holds
itself out as a common carrier, ready to contract with all persons
but the plaintiff, and does contract generally with all who offer to
traverse the route with them-then it is a common carrier for the
whole distance under the law, without reference to the termination of its road ; and it is its duty, as such carrier, to contract
with and convey the plaintiff with the rest. The allegation of the
complaint is that defendant is such carrier. The allegation is
sufficient, if the proof should, be sufficient to sustain it. And
the allegation, if the fact alleged is legally possible, is admitted
by the demurrer. The allegation also is, that the plaintiff entered
upon the cars of the defendant, upon a regular train, at a regular
station for the reception of passengers, to be carried to San Frab:cisco, and there tendered the regular fare for the entire distance,
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and that the defendant refused to take him, and when at the end
of the railroad ejected him from the steamboat which would otherwise have carried him, and which did, on the same trip, carry the
other passengers to the end of the line. The precise point was
determined in Crouch v. London &' N. WF. Railway, 25 L. &
Eq. 287. In that case there were two causes of action alleged
in separate counts-one for breach of duty in refusing to carry,
as a common carrier of goods and chattels, for hire, a package
of goods for plaintiff, from Euston Square station, Middlesex
county, England, to Glasgow, in Scotland ; and the other in
refusing to convey from the same station to Sheffield, in the
county of York, England. The defendant's line toward.Glasgow
ended at Preston, at which place it connected with another and
different road-the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway, which extended to Carlisle, where it connected with still another road-the
Caledonian Railway, which was nearly all in Scotland, and
extended to Glasgow. On the route to Sheffield the defendant's
line ended at Rugby, at which point it connected with the Midlnd.Railway, which extended to Sheffield. These roads were all
owned by different companies organized under different Acts of
Parliament. There was an arrangement, however, between the
defendant and the other companies by which the defendant loaded
its own van and locked it; and it passed through the entire distance over the other roads to Glasgow and Sheffield respectively,
the several companies furnishing the steam power and- management on their own roads, conveying it through to its*destination
for the defendant. The plaintiff himself was a common carrier of
packages, which he collected in small parcels from his customers
in London, and packed into one or more large parcels, called
" packed parcels," and sent them to Glasgow, Sheffield, and other
points, to his local agents, to be distributed to the parties to
whom the several smaller parcels were respectively addressed; he
depending'upon and using h6 railways of defendant and other
companies in the ordinary course of his business, as common carrier of parcels for the purpose of forwarding the'goods to his
local offices. The officers of the defendant made an order upon
their minutes, directing that "1 packed parcels" should be received
or invoiced to the termini of their lines only, and gave instructions accordingly to their servants, of which order plaintiff had
notice. They had not, however, at the time when the breach of
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duty complained of occurred, enforced the order with reference
to merchants, traders, and parties other than the plaintiff, who
was himself sending such packages in the exercise of his own
ordinary business of common carrier. TInder these circumstances,
in the ordinary course of his business, the plaintiff tendered a
" packed parcel" to the defendant at its station, at Euston Square,
London, in time for the regular mail train of defendant for Sheffield; also a similar package in-time for the train for Glasgow, at
the same time tendering the ordinary charges through, and
defendant refused to receive them on the ground that they were
"packed parcels." The plaintiff then paid the charges to the
end of the routes of the defendant, and they were received and
forwarded to the end of their roads, and delivered to the connecting companies, who transmitted them on -to their destination,
where they arrived in due time by that mode of carriage, but the
package for Sheffield arrived some seven, and the package for
Glasgow some twenty hours later than they would have done had
they been received and book~d, and had defendant undertaken to
carry for the entire route. The expense by the several transfers
was also increased. The defendant at the same time, and by the
same train, received, carried, and delivered "packed parcels" for
other parties. The question was, whether defendant was liable
for breach of duty in refusing to carry beyond the termini of its
own lines. The fifty-eighth" and fifty-ninth pleas raised the question, whether the defendant could become a common carrier
beyond the limits of its owNn line, on the grdund that anything
beyond such limits would be ultra vires. But a demurrer having
been interposed, so little confidence had counsel in these pleas,
that they were abandoned by theif on the argument (25 Eng. L.
& Eq. 289). It was then contended that the defendant was a
common carrier only to the extent of its own line for ordinary
parcels. Secondly, that at all events it was a common carrier
only to the extent of its own line with respect to "packed parcels."
Thirdly, that as Glasgow is beyond the realm, the defendant
could not be a common carrier, nor bound to convey from London
to Glasgow in the sense of the averment in the declaration. The
court have no difficulty with the first two propositions, and only
spend time in discussing the last. JERVIS, C. J., says: "I am
of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to our judgment. The
effect of the eighty-sixth, eighty-seventh, and eighty-ninth sections
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of the Railways Clauses Act is to put this company, the defeiudants, on the footing of common carriers, and the question is,
whether, viewing them in that character, they are liable in the
present form of action. I think they are liable on the first
count, that, holding themselves out as common carriers in England, and professing as such to carry from London to Glasgow,
they are liable for refusing to accept goods to be carried from the
one terminus to the other. It is not denied now, although the
authorities upon the subject are not numerous, that if a person
holds himself out as a common carrier from London to Oxford,
both termini being within the realm, he is bound to carry, within
reasonable limits, all goods that may be tendered to him to be
carried from London to Oxford. The only question on this part
of the case is, whether that rule applies where one of the termini
is a place out of England; and I think it does. If a person who
holds himself out as a common carrier accepts goods, the common
law of England, that is, the law founded on the custom of the
realm, engrafts on such acceptance a contract to take and safely
carry the goods, %ad to deliver them as an insurer, with certain
exceptions, viz.: the acts of God and the king's enemies.
"It was admitted during the argument, and could not be denied,
that if the defendants had accepted the goods in London the common law would have engrafted on their contract an obligation to
carry them to Glasgow, subject to the liability I have mentioned.
The case of Zorse v. 'lue would seem to be an authority to that
extent, and the commentaries on that case seem to put the matter
beyond doubt. Then, if it is admitted that when once they have
held themselves out as common carriers, there is engrafted on
their acceptance of the goods the common-law liability to carry,
even if they are to carry beyond the realm, it would seem also
that they are subject to the other part of the common-law liability,
namely, to accept within reasonable limits all goods that may be
tendered to them to carry. If, therefore, being carriers within
the realm, they are bound to take the goods offered to them to be
carried within the realm,, it follows that if they profess to be carriers beyond the realm, being themselves at the time they so
profess within the realm, they are bound to accept and to carry
goods beyond the realm upon the same terms on which they profess to contract. On the first point, therefore, I am clearly of
opinion that the count is good which charges them with that lia-
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bility, anl that they are liable for their breach of duty in refusing
to carry, having held themselves out as common carriers, and professed to carry goods for all persons to Glasgow.
"The second point, that they were not carriers to Sheffield, is
disposed of by the evidence, which shows that they were carriers
not only from London to Rugby, but on to Sheffield. They are
also carriers to Sheffield of packed parcels. Their practice is to
carry packed parcels in every case except for the plaintiff.
Although it is true that their liability rests on the professions
which they hold out, and as found in the case, that they have
given directions that they would only carry packed parcels to the
terminus of their own line, still, their uniform course of conduct
and practice with regard to the rest of the world has been in
direct contradiction to these directions. They do carry packed
parcels to Sheffield, and the law will not allow them to say: ' We
will, in fact, carry for ninety-nine of the public out of a hundred
to Sheffield, and for the hundredth we will only carry to Rugby.'
They are common carriers and must adopt the same course of
practice to all ; and it being found in the case that it was their
habit to carry packed parcels for everybody but the plaintiff, they
must act with the same justice to him as to the rest of the world :"'
Id. 298.
The learned Chief Justice refers to the 86th, 87th, and 89th
sections of the Act of 8th Victoria, before mentioned in this
opinion. We have examined those provisions to see what bearing
they have upon the case. The 86th section contains substantially
the same provision as the ninth subdivision of section 17 of our
Railway Act, before cited. The 87th section authorizes a rail-way company to contract with any other railway company for the
passage of its engines, coaches, wagons, or other carriages over
the road of such other company upon such terms as may be mutually agreed upon by the contracting parties. The 89th section
simply provides that railway companies shall not be subjected to
other or greater liabilities than were imposed on common carriers
by the common law-(stats. 8 Vict. p. 124, oh. xx., sects. 86, 87, 89,
Lond. Law Jour. 1845). But, as has been before remarked, it
was decided in England before the passage of this act, and apparently without reference to any express statutory provisions on the
subject, that railway companies could render themselves liable by
contract to carry beyond the termini of their roads-that the
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capacity to make such contracts existed. On this point, then, the
statute could have added no new power. The most that could be
claimed for the 87th section as to this point, if it were necessary
to invoke it, is, that it is applicable to railways within the realm,
and that to that extent a power in railway companies to contract
beyond their own lines may be implied from the express authority
to contract with other companies to run their carriages over the
road of such other company. And possibly as much may be
inferred from the authority found in our act for one company to
unite its road with any other railroad. It may, however, be
argued with equal plausibility, that the power to contract to carry
beyond the line of any company having been before established
by judicial decision under the general powers conferred by the
statutes as they then stood, the powlr contained in the 87th section was given to facilitate and encourage the exercise of the
other power which- already existed, and thereby secure greater
expedition in the transaction of business, and greatly subserve
the interest of both railway companies and the public.
We have already seen that the power in a railroad corporation
to contract to carry beyond the terminus of its own road is established in this country by an almost unbroken chain of decisions.
In Willey v. West Cornwall Railway (a late English case cited
by Redfield from 30 Law Times 261), it is stated to be "also
said that the company are as much bound by contract to carry
beyond their own route, where the transportation is partly by
water, as if it were all by rail, and that the company cannot
defend upon the ground that a contract to carry beyond their own
route is ultra vires" (Red. on Rail. 287, note). The case is not
accessible in any other form, and is therefore cited as stated in
Redfield's note. This is in consonance with the principle announced in Noyes v. 1. 4' B.. Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 111, before
cited, where the Chief Justice Bays: "It seems to be now settled
that railroad companies, as common carriers, may make valid
contracts to carry beyond the limits of their own road, either by
land or water, and thus become liable for the acts and neglects
of other carriers in no sense under their control." And this
result also necessarily follows from the principles adopted in all
the other cases.
This power to make a contract with one party to convey beyond
the terminus of the road being established, it follows that any

WHEELER v. RAILROAD CO.

617

number of such contracts may be made with other parties, and
that the corporation making them may, by contracting and holding itself out as ready to contract generally with all parties
standing in the same relation to it, and by its general course of
business become a common carrier beyond its own line. The
principle established by the case of Crouch v. NV. W. Railway i%
that corporations having the power to contract and become common carriers beyond their lines within the realm, have power to
become such beyond the realm; that having the capacity to contract and become common carriers beyond their lines of road,
they become suci by holding themselves out to be common carriers, and that when the common-law liability to carry both
within and beyond the realm once attaches by reason of such
holding out, they are also subject to the other part of the commonlaw liability, namely, to accept, within reasonable limits, all
goods that may be tendered to them. In the language of the
Chief Justice, before cited: "If, therefore, being carriers within
the realm, they are bound to take the goods offered to them to be
carried within the realm, it follows that if they profess to be carriers beyond the realm, being themselves at the time they so profess within the realm, they are bound to accept and to carry
goods beyond the realm upon the terms they profess to contract:"
25 Eng. L. L Eq. 298. The principles, of course, apply to carriers of passengers as well as to carriers of goods.
Upon the authorities cited and principles stated the defendant
in this case had power to contract, and to incur the duties and
responsibilities of a common carrier of freight and passengers for
hire over the entire line described in the complaint, irrespective'
of the question as to whether it legally owned or controlled the
steamer by means of which a portion of the carriage was to be
effected. The averment, then, "that defendant was a common
carrier of such freight and passengers for hire on said railroad
and steamboat," is the averment of a fact possible in law as well
as in fact, and the fact averred is admitted by the demurrer.
But it is alleged that said defendant "1was the owner and proprietor, and had under its management, direction, and control a
certain railroad, together with the tracks, cars, locomotives, and
other appurtenances thereto belonging, and was also the owner
and had unider its control, management, and direction a certain
steamboat known as and called by the name ISacramento;' that
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said railroad ran from the wharf of said company, on the east
side of the bay of San Francisco, in the county of Alameda
aforesaid, and extended to the interior of said county to a place
known as 'Haywards,' a distance of some sixteen miles or thereabouts; that said steamer, under the management and control of
defendant, connected with said railroad at said wharf for the purpose of carrying freight and passengers to and from San Francisco on the west side of said bay, forming one continuous line of
railway and steamboat -transportation to and from the places.
above named and intermediAte stations on the route of said road,
carrying thereupon freight and passengers for hire, and that
defendant was a.common carrier of such freight and passengers
for hire on said railroad and steamboat." And it is insisted by
the appellant that the ownership and control of the whole line,
including the steamer, is, or may be, under the law strictly within
the route and powers of the defendant as a railroad company, by
the express terms of section 17 of the statute under which it is
organized. That the steamer may be and is a part of the "*other
property of any description," which the defendant is authorized
" to hold" for "any other purpose hecessary for the conveniences
of such companies, in order to transact the business usual for such
railroad companies."
We all know, as a part of the general geography of the country,
that in constructing railways large and navigable rivers, creeks,
bays, and arms of tlie sea are, and must of necessity often be
crossed; that when the necessity arises, they are crossed sometimes by means of expensive bridges, upon which a railway track
is laid, and which thus literally become a part of the railway
itself; that at other times, where the waters of the river, creek,
bay, or arm of the sea are so broad and deep as to render bridging impra~ticable, or where -a bridge would be too great an
obstruction to navigation to render such a mode of crossing
admissible, the object is effected by means of a steamboat-a
steam ferry. Such instances may be found on lines or connecting lines of railways crossing the Susquehanna, Delaware, Hudson, Ohio, Mississippi, and other large and navigable rivers.
Sometimes these occasions for the employment of steam ferries or
bridges arise in the course of the line of the road, and sometimes
at the point separating the land road from the city, which is the
ultimate starting-point or destination of all passengers and freight
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which pass over it-the substantial terminus of the road. Any
party who has travelled over the line of railway from New York
to Washington, has had occasion to know that there are at least
three of these steam ferries, which constitute indispensable links
in the line of railroad travel-one of which must be crossed at
the beginning of the route, and the others on the way. Will it
be pretended when such a necessity for using a steamboat upon
the line of the. road arises, that the steam ferry is not substantially and in legal contemplation a part of the road-as much so
as the bridge would be at the same point, if a bridge were
practicable or otherwise admissible ? That it would not be "necessary for the conveniences of such company, in order to transact
the business usual for such railroad company," within the meaning of the provision of the statute ? How would itbe possible to
carry on the business of such railroad companies successfully, and
in a manner to subserve the public interest, and fully accomplish
the ends for which the corporation was created without such conveniences ? It is manifest to us that the right to own and control steamboats for the purposes of ferriage, under such circumstances, is a necessity, and clearly within the powers conferred by
the statute. Are these conveniences any the less necessary or
proper because they happen to be at the end instead of in the
middle of the route ? Take the city of New York, for an example, the great commercial metropolis of the continent-the centre
to which most of the extensive systems of railways of the country
tend, and really the ultimate point upon which the vast commerce
and travel passing over them is discharged. We all know it is
situate on an island, and that not a railroad can enter its precincts.
unless over a bridge, or by means of a steam ferry. Does the
railway which purports to extend to New York terminate on the
opposite side of the strait, or river, or bay ? Are the proper
functions of the various railways, purporting to terminate at that
city, properly and completely performed under the law of their
creation, when their myriads of passengers and millions of tons
of freight are poured out of their cars on the banks of the river,
strait, or bay, opposite New York, in sight only of the promised
land ? We think not, and that the full performance of their duties
to the public requires that they should own and control, not such
conveniences merely, but absolute necessities, as steamboats for
ferrying over their passengers and freight. Iii no other way can
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the public interests be adequately subserved, and the objects of
the creation of such corporations be completely accomplished. It is
one thing to build and own a line of steamers to some fo:eigncountry, or some distant port; carrying on ' wholly distinct and
independent business entirely foreign to the objects of a railroad
corporation, which might just as well, and a great deal better, be
transacted by some other company organized for the purpose ;
and quite another, to own and control a steamboat for crossing
rivers and bays which lie in the line of the road, and the use of
which is convenient, proper, and necessary to a successful accomplishment of the objects for which the road is built and operated.
The cases cited by the respondent are of the first class; and were
mostly brought by stockholders to restrain the directors from
misappropriating the funds of the corporation to objects not within
the scope of its powers, and not ations by third parties against
the corporation for breaches of contracts or duties. They do not,
therefore, conflict with the views we have suggested.
We all know, also, that the city of San Francisco is situate
something. like New York, and wholly inaccessible to any railroad
except from the south, without making a detour of one hundred
miles or more, or the use of some .means of transportation across
the bay by water. This particular fact is not set out in the
pleadings, but it may be hypothetically assumed for the purposes
of argument and illustration. If this be so, and it is possible to
be so, it may be convenient and necessary for a railroad from the
north, north-east, or east, designed to terminate at San Francisco,,
the commercial metropolis of the Pacific coast, to own and control a steam ferry to facilitate the legitimate ordinary business of
the company, and subserve those public interests which it was
contemplated would be promoted when the act under which the
defendant is organized was passed. The act, as we have seen,
authorizes companies organized under it, 1 to construct their
roads across * * * any roadstead, bay, navigable stream,"
&c. (sec. 17, Sub. Fifth). It may be that the waters of the Bay
of San Francisco are too deep to admit of bridging, or construction of a road, literally so called, or that the interests of navigation would render such a proceeding inadmissible. In such event
the only practicable mode of crossing and connecting the road
with its ostensible and substantial terminus, the city of San Francisco, might be by means of steamboats, which might therefore
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be rendered necessary and convenient to the defendant in properly transacting the ordinary business for which it was organized. If so necessary to the accomplishment of the proper
objects of its creation, and the successful transaction of its ordinary business, we think the ownership and control of a steamboat
for that purpose would be within the powers incidental and
express conferred upon the defendant by the act.
If the views expressed are correct, and we have no doubt they
are, it follows that the facts alleged as to the control of the steamboat by defendant are legally possible, and the truth of the allegations is admitted by the demurrer. We think the court erred
in sustaining the demurrer.
Judgment reversed, with directions to the District
Court to vacate the order sustaining the demurrer,
and permit defendant to answer upon the usual terms.

Supreme Court of Arcansas.
mARY H. BOWMAN v. ELISHA WORTHINGTON.
Alimony has no existence at common law as a separate and independent right,
but only as an incident to a proceeding for some other purpose.
There is no inherent jurisdiction in a court of chancery to grant alimony.
A divorced wife, having married, again, is not entitled to alimony from her first
husband.
The Circuit Courts of Arkansas have jurisdiction of divorce and alimony, but
the latter is incidental to the former and cannot be granted in a separate suit
where it is the only relief sought.

APPEAL from the Chicot Circuit Court in Chancery.
Appellant, who was also plaintiff below, married respondent in
1840, in Kentucky, and resided afterwards in Arkansas for a
short time, when, in consequence of his adultery, she left him
and returned to Kentucky, where in 1843 she was divorced by a
special Act of the legislature of that state. In 1847 she married Bowman, who died in 1854.
In 1866 she commenced this suit for alimony from her first
husband, and set forth the foregoing facts in her bill. Defendant
demurred specially for the following reasons, among others:- "
1st. That the power of the Circuit Court to grant alimony,
depends entirely on the statute, by which alimony is dependent
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upon and incidental to a divorce from the bonds of matrimony,
granted by the same court.
2d. That the marriage had been annulled by the Act of the
Kentucky legislature, and that alimony can only be awarded to
a wife, as such, out of the property of her husband as such, in
virtue of a subsisting marriage status, and that after a divorce
granted, the court could have no jurisdiction of a bill fbr alimony.
3d. That the complainant married a second time-that would
have revoked alimony, if it had been already granted-and so
created a bar to the relief soight.
The demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed, whereupon
plaintiff appealed
.PFike & Adams, for appellant.
Garland & Nash and W. H. Sutton, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
OCL DENIN, J.-The questions raised have never been decided
by this court. Owing to the peculiar jurisdiction of the English
courts upon this subject until the 'year 1858, we have not been
able to find, that light and information which we generally find, to
aid us in our judgment, in the adjudications made by the great
and learned of the profession in the country from which we get
the foundation of most of our law. Nor have we found many
cases in the American courts where the same points as in this
were before the courts, and adjudicated by'them. The application in this case is for alimony. We do not understand the bill
to pray for anything else.
By our Statute of Divorce, chap. 59, Digest, jurisdiction in
dirorce and matrimonial causes, including alimony, is conferred
upon the Circuit Court, sitting as a Court of Chancery. The
statute is an original provision, no part of the English ecclesiastical law having been expressly adopted in this state. Where
by statute jurisdiction-over particular subjects of equity is conferred, or given to common-law courts, the entire body of laws
administered in-the equity courts of this country attaches to the
matter immediately on. the jurisdiction being created. But the
subject of divorce, and all incidental questions, including alimony
and matrimonial causes, are not subjects of equitable jurisdiction.
Courts of equity in England did not exercise jurisdiction over
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them. They were confined to the Ecclesiastical Courts-they
alone adjudicated upon them. During the Commonwealth the
Ecclesiastical Courts were abolished, and the Courts of Chancery,
for a time, in virtue of special authority, given in their commissions, took jurisdiction of the causes; but after the Restoration,
an Act of Parliament, confirmatory, was passed to justify this
assumption of jurisdiction.
The Ecclesiastical Courts in England retained exclusive jurisdiction of divorce and matrimonial causes until the 20th and 21st
year of Victoria: by Act of Parliament the jurisdiction was
transferred to a new court, styled, "The Court of Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes."
The Circuit Courts of this state, sitting as Courts of Chancery,
have jurisdiction of all cases of divorce and alimony by virtue of
the statute. The court in cases of this kind must look to and be
governed by the statute. It has no other power than those
"expressly conferred; and while it may sit as a Court of Chancery,
it is not to be understood as exercising inherent chancery powers,
but as a court limited and guided by express statutory provision
over a subject-matter never belonging to chancery jurisdiction.
It is then the Circuit Court, invested expressly by statute with
authority to investigate and try cases of this kind, by rules of
proceeding adopted and practised in Courts of Chancery.
The question then arises, has the Circuit Court, sitting as a
Court of Chancery, jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for
and decree alimony? Our statute points out the court that can
entertain the jurisdiction. It not only locates the jurisdiction,
but it details the manner, the time when, and the circumstances
under which, and the causes for which, alimony may be adjudged.
The first section of our statute, chap. 59, Digest Arkansas,
enumerates the causes for which a divorce may be granted. The
third section says: "The Circuit Court, sitting as a Court of
Chancery, shall have jurisdiction in all cases of divorce and alimony, or maintenance, and like process and proceedings shall be
had in said cases as are had in other cases on the equity side of
the court, except that the answer of the defendant need not be
under oath."
The fourth section defines the necessary qualifications of tile
bill of complaint, and the ninth section provides: "That when a
decree shall be entered, the court shall make such order touching
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the alimony of.the wife and care of the children, if there be any,
as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case shall be reasonable ;" and in the eleventh section it is
enacted: "That the Circuit Court shall have power also to
enrrce the performance of any decree or order for alimony ana
maintenance, by sequestration of the defendant's property, or by
such other lawful ways and means as are according to the rules
and practice of the court."
Alimony is the allowance which a husband, by order of the
court, pays to his wife living separate from him, for her maintenance: Bishop 549.
This definition is substantially the same as.that given by other
American and the English authorities, and may be said to be only
applicable to divorces a -mensa et tloro, because it presumes the
relation of husband and wife still'to exist, although the parties
are separated by virtue of the decree of a competent court, and
is peculiarly applicable to the. divorces granted by the courts in
England prior to the year 1858, for, inEngland previous to that
year, no judicial divorces dissolving the bonds of matrimony,
originally valid, were allowed.
The allowance of alimony may be for the use of the wife, either
during the pendency of suit, in which case it is called alimony
pendente lite, or after its termination, called permanent alimony.
It has no common-law existence as a separate, independent right,
but wherever found, it comes as an incident to a prmceedingfor
some otker purpose, as for divorce, no court in England having any
jurisdiction to grant it where it is the only thing sought: Bishop
on Marriage and Divorce 550, and the authorities cited.
As we have before suggested, we have been able to find but
few adjudications upon a point similar to the one we are now considering. In the case of Shottwell v. Shottwell, 1 Sm. &.M.
Chan. Rep. 51, which is a cas and application similar to the one
before us, except that there had been a judicial decree of a competent court of the state of Mississippi, dissolving, the bonds of
matrimony, the chancellor says: "That a separate suit by bill or
petition may be maintained for alimony after a decree for a
divorce in which such claim was omitted, if there was no express
act of the wife waiving her right thereto." But this opinion of
the chancellor was, we think, subsequently overruled by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Lawson v. Shotwell,
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27 Miss. Rep. 631 (and which appears to be a branch of the case
of Shottwell v. Shottwell). The Supreme Court, in alluding to the
decree for divorce that had been granted, and its effect and operation, say: "1The Constitution authorizes the legislature to give
the Circuit Courts equity jurisdiction in all cases whereof the
thing or amount in controversy does not exceed $500 ; also in all
cases of divorce and for the foreclosure of mortgages."
The legislature by the Act of March 2d 1833, organizing the
Circuit Courts, among other things, declares in the language of
the constitution, in defining the equity jurisdiction of these courts,
that it shall extend to cases of divorce, &c. The court, further
say, "the question then comes up for decision, whether the law, '
by investing the Circuit Courts with full power to decree a
divorce, intended that the court might go further and decree
alimony, or an allowance to the wife out of the husband's property. The authorities on this subject, almost without exception,
agree that alimony is allowed only as an incident to some other
proceeding, which may be legally instituted by the wife against
the husband as such, for instance, as an action for the restitution
of conjugal rights, divorce, &c. ; in which cases temporary alimony is allowed pending the suit, and permanent alimony on rendering the final decree in a divorce case in favor of the wife ;"
and the court again say that, "Having decided, then, that the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was full and complete in the
divorce case, as to the matter now in controversy, at least so far
as the claim for alimony is concerned, and the complainant having
failed to ask a decree in this respect, the question is, whether the
present bill shall be entertained by the Superior Court of Chancery.
While equity inclines at the proper time and in the proper case to
administer justice on a liberal scale in favor of an injured wife,
against a guilty husband, yet it can dispense with none of those
salutary rules constituting part of the system in her favor, any
more than in the cause of a less favored party. Matters which
appropriately belong, to the case in the Circuit Court, and which
might by ordinary diligence have been embraced in its decree or
final action, ought not upon principles of policy to be again litigated between the same parties in another court ;" and the court,
after saying that the bill cannot be entertained, say: "We do
not intend to intimate that there may not be cases in which an
original bill, after a decree for a divorce, could not be maintained.
VoL. XV.-40
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A good reason.must be alleged why the alimony was not at the
proper time allowed. What will be a good reason must depend
upon the facts of the case when presented."
Another case is Bichlardsonv. Wilson, 8 Yerg. 67. Wilson, the
husband, presented to the legislature of Tennessee a petition fof
divorce without the knowledge of his wife, and the legislature
passed an act divorcing the parties, which act contained a proviso, "That nothing in this act shall deprive the said Mary Ann
of her right to alimony, if by law she is entitled to the same."
The wife brought her bill for alimony, and Wilson defended,
armed, as he supposed, with the weapon he had himself procured
from the legislature ; but the court decided that it cut both waysthat while it cut him loose from the bonds of matrimony, it carved
out of his estate a maintenance and support for her who had been
his wife; intimating also, that even-without the proviso to the act,
the court would have maintained her right to alimony.
Justice PEcK (concurring with Chief Justice CATRON, who had
delivered an opinion), in an opinion replete with interest, says:
" If the legislature have, while the Act of 1799 was in force,
stepped in the place of judicial authority and granted the divorce,
cannot the courts of justice take up the cause exactly where the
legislature left it, and make inquiry as if the divorce had been
then and there granted by the court ?"
We are not advised what are the particular features of the Act
of 1799 of Tennessee; under which the court acted, so as to be
able to compare it with the provisions of our own statute, under
which we are called to decide.
We have also been referred to the case of Fischliv. Fischdi, 1
Blackford 360, as in point, to strengthen the position, that a bill
for alimony, as a -eparate claim, cannot be maintained ; but as
we have not been able to procure the volume referred to, we can
only refer to it as we find" it-alluded to approvingly by Mr.
Bishop, in his well-considered wvork on Marriage and Divorce.
The only direct decision upon this point we have been able to
procure, made by the English courts since the 'passage of Act
20 & 21 Viet., establishing a court for Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes, is Winston v. Winston & Dyne, 3 Swabey & Tristram's
Rep. 245 ; and from the section of the law given in the opinion,
it will be seen that -it is like our statute, a law giving to a court
jurisdiction in certain and specified cases. The case was a peti
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tion for permanent alimony after a decree for dissolution. The
32d section of the law by which the court acquired jurisdiction to
decree alimony, is, "The court may, if it shall think fit, on any
such decree (i. e., for dissolution of marriage), order that the
husband shall, to the satisfaction of the court, secure to the wife
such gross sum of money, or such annual sum of money, for any
term not exceeding her own life, as, having regard to the fortune,
if any, to the ability of the husband, and the conduct of the parties, it shall deem reasonable," after referring to the circumstances in the case.
The Judge Ordinary says: "This is a novel attempt with
respect to permanent alimony; anything in the nature of permanent alimony in a case of dissolution of marriage is the creature
of the 32d section of the Divorce Act. I cannot think that the
32d section intended that after a decree nisi of dissolution
obtained against the wife, she shall be at liberty to file her petition for alimony."
Bishop, in his work on Marriage aud Divorce 553, 554, after
referring to some of the courts that had maintained the chancery
jurisdiction to grant alimony, says: -" The inherent jurisdiction
to grant alimony is also acknowledged in Virginia, Kentucky, in
South Carolina, and in Alabama," referring to cases in those
states. But he says these are exceptions to the general rule,
and departures likewise from principle.
"In some of the other states the jurisdiction has been expressly
denied, in some others by necessary implication, and probably it
could not now be established in any state where it had not
already been maintained, though there is some strength of argu-.
ment, and some apparent weight of authority in favor of the
jurisdiction."
From the views thus given and the authorities we have examined,
we have come to the conclusion that alimony being an incident to
the divorce, by the peculiar phraseology of our statute, the courts
of this state can only so grant it, and that in connection with the
decree for divorce, and that the Circuit Court has not jurisdiction
to entertain a separate application for alimony.
We have arrived at this conclusion with some reluctance, for
we would have preferred, if we could have done so consistently
with our views of the law, to have favored the jurisdiction, that

BOWM\IAN v. WORTHINGTON.

the complainant might have got the relief she asked; but we
believe she is now without the remedy she might have availed
herself of at the time she was compelled by the conduct of her
husband to leave him.
In 1841, when she left her husband, the same law was in force
that is in force now, and she could have availed herself of it, and
got such relief as the law and the courts can give in such cases;
she then had a right and a remedy to enforce her right, but she
thought proper to resort to a tribunal in her native state, and it
granted her what she asked-to be released from an unkind and
adulterous husband, and to be restored to her maiden name.
'But should we be mistaken in the view we. have taken of this
point in the case, there is another raised.by the bill and demurrer,
which we think would defeat the application.
The bill shows that the complainant was divorced by the legislature of Kentucky in 1843, and that in 1847 she married Benjamin H. Bowman, who died in 1854, and that she is now the
widow of Bowman. In this state of facts, and taking the broadest
definition of alimony, that it is that portion of the estate of the
husband which the court allows to- the wife on her divorce from
him, for her support and maintenance, can we say that she is
now entitled to such support and maintenance ? She is the widow
of Bowman, and as such entitled to dower in his estate. If she
is entitled to alimony now, she would have been so in 1847 after
her second marriage and if suit had been brought in his lifetime,
he must have joined his wife in such suit, and the second husband
and his wife would prosecute the first husband for the maintenance and support of the wife. We do not suppose the law ever
contemplated or would encourage such a proceeding. By the
contract of marriage, the husband assumes the obligation to sup.
port his wife. 'It is his duty to do so, and the law will enforce
the duty, and although the bonds of matrimony be dissolved,
still if the wife claims it in proper time, and before the proper
tribunal, the law will enforce her claim. But when the wife
seeks a divorce a vinculo, and marries again, she fixes upon the
new husband the obligation to support her. If the complainant
in this case had presented her application for divorce and alimony
under our statute, and she had been divorced and alimony
assigned to her, and she had again married, we have no doubt it
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would have been' in the power of the court that granted the
divorce and allowed the alimony to have ordered its payment to
cease, and upon this point, and the effect of a second marriage,
we have the light of direct adjudications.
In the case of Albee v. lWayman, 10 Gray 222, a divorce a
vinculo and alimony had been decreed. Mrs. Wayman married
again, and in consequence of that marriage, the court say, "the
application for a divorce and alimony was her own affair, a voluntary act of hers instituted for her benefit; so long as she remained
unmarried, no ground existed for lessening the amount of such
alimony, while, of course, it was open to her application for
increase for good cause. By her act of subsequent marriage, she
secured herself other resources for her support, and thus voluntarily furnished the ground for the reduction of the alimony,"
and it was reduced to a nominal amount.
In the case of Fisherv. Fisher, 2 Swabey & Tristram's Rep.
411, the court say: "If hereafter the petitioner (who had petitioned for divorce and alimony) should become guilty of immorality, it would be unreasonable to call upon the former husband
to maintain her. Again; if she avails herself of the freedom
conferred by the decree of this court, and marries again, it would
be unreasonable to compel the former husband to support her."
And again, in the case of Sidney v. ,S'idney, 4 Swabey & Tristram's Rep. 180, the same principle is announced.
These authorities we think to be in accordance with the law,
with propriety and good sense, and we therefore hold, because
of the second marriage, the complainant in this case is not entitled to have maintenance and support decreed to her from her'
first husband; and having disposed of the case.upon the two
points considered, we deem. it unnecessary to consider or decide
upon the others made by the demurrer.
The.decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill is
affirmed.

